Reliance on police as default responders to people experiencing a mental health crisis has led to frequent entanglements of people with serious mental illnesses within the criminal legal system (
1,
2). People with serious mental illnesses (such as psychotic or mood disorders) are overrepresented in jails and prisons, and an estimated 25% of people with mental disorders have been arrested (
3–
5). People with mental illnesses are also overrepresented among those killed by police (
6). Meanwhile, the public and policy makers have increasingly recognized that many encounters with people experiencing a behavioral health crisis could be addressed by mental health professionals working in collaboration with or independently of police officers. Social justice movements have created momentum for alternative crisis response models, and recent implementation of an easily accessible national crisis hotline, 988, has invigorated discussions about how to strengthen a long-neglected crisis care system. A range of crisis response models now exists, along with guidance for practitioners and policy makers (
7–
9).
Among the best-known models of crisis response are the crisis intervention team (CIT) model and the co-responder model. The CIT model involves a specialized, police-based program with strong community partnerships that includes 40 hours of officer training on identifying people with mental health issues, deescalating encounters, and linking people to care. Trained officers then serve as specialized responders to mental health–related calls (
10). Co-responder models use mental health clinicians and police officers, who collaboratively respond to crisis calls to deescalate crises and link individuals to services (
11). A third type of response involves providing phone-based support to police officers in the field by linking them to a mental health professional who can discuss presenting behaviors and options for intervention (
12,
13).
Outside of police-based responses, recommendations have been made for wider implementation of mobile crisis teams (
14,
15). Mobile crisis teams are dispatched from the mental health system and provide onsite assessment, intervention, consultation, and referral (
16). Recently, a broader range of nonpolice crisis response models have emerged. These models are housed in different agencies (e.g., mental health agencies, nonprofits, and fire and emergency medical service departments) and are staffed in multiple ways (e.g., by clinicians, medical practitioners, crisis workers, and peer workers). Such models are proliferating, but their outcomes have not been rigorously evaluated; existing studies are primarily observational (
17).
Individuals with serious mental illnesses and their family members are the end users of crisis response models and have the most to gain or lose in a crisis. To date, their preferences related to response models have received little attention. Qualitative studies outside the United States suggest that negative experiences and low expectations related to crisis response among clients and family members make them hesitant to access crisis services until the crisis is severe (
18–
20). These studies have found that service users report a variety of experiences with both police and mental health crisis teams. Clients and families have reported that police involvement can be stigmatizing and can exacerbate crises (
19,
20). Experiences with nonpolice crisis teams are not uniformly positive either, particularly because of wait times and limited availability.
This study aimed to elicit the perspectives of mental health clients with a history of arrest and of their family members or close friends regarding four established crisis response models: the CIT model, co-responder model, telephone linkage model, and nonpolice model (i.e., mobile crisis or community responder model). We designed a qualitative supplement to an ongoing randomized controlled trial of a new police–mental health linkage system in Georgia to understand the experiences of people with serious mental illnesses interacting with police and to learn about their preferences for the crisis response models listed above. We aimed to identify clients’ needs when they are in crisis, the models they most and least prefer, and key factors shaping their preferences.
Results
Demographic characteristics of clients and their family and friends are presented in
Tables 2 and
3. Most interviewed clients identified as men (62%). Slightly more than half were Black (54%), and almost all identified as non-Hispanic (98%). Their mean±SD age was 34.7±7.8 years. Overall, 40% (N=20) reported living with a family member, 20% (N=10) reported living alone, and only one person (2%) reported being homeless. Clients reported a history of arrest for an average of 2.2 of the five charges of interest. (We did not ask about arrests on other charges.) Very few clients (N=8, 16%) endorsed having knowingly had experiences with any of the described models: CIT model (N=4, 8%), co-responder model (N=1, 2%), telephone linkage (N=1, 2%), or nonpolice response (N=5, 10%).
Most family and friends were women (72%), Black (56%), and non-Hispanic (100%). Seven (39%) were first-degree relatives, six (33%) were spouses or partners, and five (28%) were friends or roommates.
Client Needs During Mental Health Crisis
Clients and their family and friends were aligned in describing clients’ needs during a crisis. Participants discussed concrete needs, including crisis line access, medications, safety plans, sobriety, and prayer or religion. However, the most common needs cited related to the environment and interpersonal connections. Participants highlighted the importance of being calm, relaxed, and in a safe environment. One client stated, “No boisterous, loud, chaotic situations. I’m talking about calm, collected approaches” (client 1). They also discussed the value of having somebody to talk to and of feeling supported. Notably, clients described how they often reach out to informal supports first when in crisis, rather than involving a professional. As one client stated, “I need to get out of that [situation] I’m in. . . . That’s usually what triggers my emotions the most. . . . So I would have to figure out where my [support] person is . . . because he knows how to calm me down the most and get me out of the situation” (client 2).
Participants generally agreed about the need for empathy and understanding. One family member stated, “She needs to know that she’s not alone. She needs to know that everybody else is going through some similar problems” (family 1). Similarly, a client described the need for an empathetic approach: “All they need is compassion . . . they need to feel loved . . . they need to feel that ‘Hey, I’m—I’m not here to harm you, I’m not here to do anything to you. I’m here to help’” (client 3).
Most and Least Preferred Models
Clients and their family and friends were mostly consistent in selecting their most and least preferred crisis response models. As shown in
Figure 1, the most preferred model was a nonpolice response (clients: N=24, 48%; family and friends: N=11, 61%), followed by the co-responder model (clients: N=13, 26%; family and friends: N=3, 17%). CIT was the least preferred model (clients: N=28, 56%; family and friends: N=12, 67%). Although the nonpolice response option was preferred by the most participants, almost one-quarter of clients (N=11, 22%) chose the nonpolice response as their least preferred option.
Importance of Trained Responders
The most commonly cited advantage of the nonpolice response model was that it involves a range of professionals trained to respond to mental health crises (clients: N=26, 52%; family and friends: N=10, 56%). “They actually know how to talk to you, know how to handle you, deal with you at that time in that situation. . . . I feel like they’re trained for that,” remarked one client (client 4). A family member said, “The advantage is they’re all trained. They all know what they’re dealing with. And so, you know, if there’s a decision that this person needs to be committed, the decision is made onsite by who has the training for it. And it’s not just somebody guessing” (family 2).
The presence of a responder with mental health training was also cited as an advantage for co-response, phone linkage, and CIT, compared with traditional police responses. With co-response, participants noted how a mental health professional “would be able to explain what’s going on to the [police] officer better” (client 5). Similarly, with the phone linkage model, participants described how a “mental health worker could give [the officer] insight as to how to go about it and approach the situation” (client 6). With respect to CIT, participants described how a police officer with mental health training would be better equipped than untrained officers, because they “would know how to interact with whichever person they need to, without getting overwhelmed and frightened” (client 2).
Participants also differentiated the models by the amount of training responders received; the most preferred models were those in which the professionals on the scene had the most training and experience with mental health crises. Thus, although participants appreciated that police receive such training, they also highlighted the pitfalls of not having enough mental health expertise present during crisis situations. One of the primary disadvantages of the phone linkage model was that the mental health professional was not physically present and that the outcome of the situation would depend on the police officer accurately relaying information to the clinician on the phone. The primary disadvantage cited for CIT was that 40 hours of mental health training was not sufficient (clients: N=19, 38%; family and friends: N=10, 56%). As one participant reflected, “I don’t think that’s anywhere near sufficient enough training to be able to handle . . . a mental health crisis” (client 7).
Negative Associations With Police
Participants reflected on how the involvement of police in crisis response could be detrimental. Clients spoke from experience, given that all of them had been arrested and that all but two reported having spent time in jail. First, 14 clients (28%) were not convinced that a CIT response was much different from a traditional police response and worried that CIT would still lead to negative consequences, such as arrest or hospitalization. “Even though they’re trained, it’s still just the police,” noted one client (client 8). Second, almost one-third of clients (N=15, 30%) and half of all family and friends (N=9) described how police could be “intimidating” or “threatening” to people in crisis. As one family member remarked, for “people who are going through mental health crisis, when they see the blue lights and see the police, sometimes it makes it worse. The stress is even more” (family 3). A friend described how police uniforms can produce a triggering response: “A uniformed officer creates a different response from people automatically, just because of the uniform. [The uniform] changes the person’s perspective altogether, rather than just plainclothe[s] people approaching the situation” (family 4). Clients agreed that police could be “triggering” because they either are afraid of police or fear the consequences of a police response. One client noted that a police response would make them “feel more anxiety about being in serious trouble, rather than actually getting help” (client 9).
Safety Concerns
Although clients and their family and friends reported negative experiences with police and cited how police could escalate crises, they also acknowledged that certain situations might require police presence: those involving the safety of the person in crisis, of the people around them, or of the professional responders. The primary disadvantage raised about the nonpolice response model concerned the lack of police presence in “unsafe” situations. This factor was cited by 12 clients (24%) and seven family members (39%), who described a range of scenarios involving safety concerns. Some participants thought police might be needed “if the person was really out of control” or “had a breakdown” or was “acting out.” Others thought that police might be required in more serious situations such as those involving serious crimes, violence, weapons, and harm to self. “If that person is at the point where they have a weapon . . . sometimes the police are needed” (family 1). Three participants used the word “authority” when referencing the type of skills and presence police bring to such situations.
The issue of ensuring the safety of mental health professionals was also raised with respect to the co-response model. Nine clients (18%) and two family members or friends (11%) expressed concerns regarding the physical danger that mental health professionals could face when responding to a crisis, even with police. One client noted, “The dangers of the social worker getting hurt, in my opinion, outweigh the benefits of getting contact [from a social worker]” (client 10). Some participants suggested that the very value of a co-response was that police would be on hand if needed. As one friend of a client noted, mental health professionals “would also be protected if something, you know, went haywire and the person overreacted” (family 5). These participants valued having two types of professionals respond so that various types of expertise could be deployed as needed.
Concerns With Nonpolice Response
One final theme emerged with respect to the nonpolice response model. Although the nonpolice response model was the most preferred overall, 11 clients (22%) and one family member (6%) indicated that a nonpolice response was their least preferred option. Most of these participants (N=8) felt that the model as described involved too many professionals at the scene. One participant noted it would feel “like an ambush” (client 6), whereas another reflected, “It’s a lot of attention . . . that would be overwhelming for me” (client 11). Furthermore, two participants expressed concern that a nonpolice response could result in hospitalization or the threat of hospitalization, which would further trigger the client. A friend of a client stated, “Some people don’t like talking to doctors. . . . They may not be as open and honest with what’s going on with them because those are professionals that sometimes we look at in a negative light as well. ‘Oh, they’re just here to take me away’” (family 6).
Discussion
This study builds understanding about clients’ and family members’ preferences for crisis response models at a time when novel models are proliferating as an alternative to police response. At least four findings from this study are noteworthy. First, similar to the findings by Boscarato et al. (
18), participants desired a calm environment and empathy during crises and described seeking informal supports before contacting formal systems. The rollout of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline, along with data indicating that 80% of crisis calls can be resolved by phone (
7), suggests that raising awareness about low-touch crisis support services could be valuable. Further research is needed to assess how successfully various response options—ranging from informal supports to call, text, and chat support and field-based responses—resolve crisis situations.
Second, the fact that participants described reaching out to informal supports suggests that there is more to learn about the value of peer versus professional support. The quality of interactions with professionals and perceptions about coercion have emerged as important factors influencing how people with mental illnesses experience contact with police or the mental health service system (
28–
30). Client perspectives should continue to inform how to redesign service systems.
Third, more than half of the participants wanted a nonpolice response when they (or their family member or friend) are experiencing a crisis, and almost one-quarter desired a co-response model. The presence of professionals with mental health expertise in the field was identified as a clear advantage over more distant forms of support from mental health professionals (i.e., via telephone) or from police officers with mental health training. This finding aligns with what advocates have long been saying: “Mental health crises deserve a mental health response” (
31). But it also invites further consideration about how communities will develop mental health–led responses. Additionally, systemic inequities are built into the mental health system (
32), and it is no coincidence that those with the least access to mental health care—Black and Latinx populations—are among the most adversely affected by disparities in the criminal legal system (
33,
34). The implementation of new models will need to be followed closely to understand whether these models reduce criminal legal system involvement and for whom. We will address issues of interpersonal and systemic racism in another analysis that will focus on participants’ reports of their experiences with the criminal legal system.
Fourth, concerns about safety were articulated by participants in weighing the advantages and disadvantages of crisis response models, although these concerns were often defined vaguely. Participants preferred nonpolice responses but also described situations where police might be necessary. Safety is a legitimate concern in some crisis situations, but varied perceptions about safety risk can unduly complicate crisis response situations in which the risk is minimal. Research is needed to define and operationalize what safety means in mental health crisis response so that appropriate responses can be dispatched.
This study had several limitations. First, it did not formally assess clients’ previous experiences with mental health crises, which is an important area for future work. However, it is fair to assume, by virtue of the parent project’s inclusion criteria, that all participants had previous experiences in this area. Second, participants had limited direct experience with crisis response models, and stated model preferences were based on having participants think hypothetically. Engaging in hypothetical thinking or forming expectations about possible outcomes can be difficult (
35,
36). Future research should include participants who have more experience with specific models. Third, to facilitate participants’ understanding, we simplified definitions of the four response models. Models are designed and operate in various ways in the field, and models may also operate together in many communities, rather than functioning as discrete entities. Therefore, our findings relate to these models’ prototypes. Fourth, all clients had been arrested on misdemeanor charges, which has the potential to bias views toward police-involved crisis response. Fifth, although we acknowledge that individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities (
37,
38) and dementia (
39) are at risk for criminal legal involvement, those groups were excluded from this study, given the nature of the parent project (i.e., the need for a high threshold of capacity to give informed consent for participation in the randomized controlled trial). Sixth, because of COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, all interviews were conducted via videoconferencing, and some participants may have been excluded from participating because they didn’t have active phone service at the time of recruitment. Finally, the sample was relatively small. Although this sample size is appropriate for a qualitative study of this nature, further research with larger samples is needed to enhance the transferability of the findings.