The Supreme Court, Child Abuse, and the Role of the State

Joshua DeShaney lived with his father, Randy DeShaney, in Winnebago County, Wisconsin. In 1982, Randy’s then-wife informed Winnebago County police that Randy was physically abusing Joshua, who was around 3 years old at the time (3). The Winnebago County Department of Social Services investigated the claim, but Randy denied the allegations, and the inquiries stopped (3). In 1983, Joshua presented to a hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions covering his body (4), leading the treating physician to suspect child abuse and report the injuries to the Department of Social Services (3). The hospital was then granted temporary custody of Joshua, and a multidisciplinary team examined the case (4). The team concluded that there was not enough evidence to keep Joshua away from his father’s custody but implemented the following protective measures: Randy was required to enroll Joshua in a preschool program and participate in counseling services (3).

Subsequently, a juvenile court returned Joshua to his father (3). A Department of Social Services caseworker also started making monthly visits to the DeShaney home (4). The caseworker noted suspicious injuries on Joshua’s head and observed that he was not enrolled in school, as previously agreed upon. Later that same year, Joshua again went to the hospital with suspicious injuries. Despite all of this, the Department of Social Services took no further action (3).

In 1984, when Joshua was 4 years old, his father beat him so badly that he suffered a massive brain hemorrhage and fell into a coma (3). The child underwent emergency neurosurgery, which revealed evidence of older brain hemorrhages (4). This, coupled with bruises in various stages of healing on his head, was consistent with shaken baby syndrome (4). Given his permanent brain damage, Joshua was expected to live the rest of his life institutionalized (4). Meanwhile, his father pled no contest to felony abuse charges and was sentenced to 4 years in prison (4).

Joshua’s mother, on behalf of Joshua, filed a lawsuit against Winnebago County, the Department of Social Services, and several individual Department of Social Services employees (3). The lawsuit claimed that by failing to intervene to protect Joshua from his father, the parties deprived Joshua of his liberty rights, without due process of law, thereby violating his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (3). Both the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found in favor of the defendants (i.e., the county and Department of Social Services). Joshua and his mother appealed to the Supreme Court (3).

Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered the Supreme Court’s opinion, finding that the State (i.e., the state of Wisconsin and its local governmental agencies and their employees) had no legal duty to protect Joshua because the due process clause did not require the State to protect its citizens from the actions of private individuals (5). According to Rehnquist, the intent of the due process clause was to prevent the State from abusing its power and protect the people, by holding that no state will “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law” (3). This did not mean that a state must ensure that people were protected from each other (3). Thus, a state’s failure to protect an individual from private violence, as in Joshua’s case, did not violate the due process clause.

The Court acknowledged some instances in which a state is obligated to protect individuals, such as those who are incarcerated or involuntarily committed for mental health reasons, under the Fourteenth Amendment (3). A state’s obligation toward these individuals stems from that state having imposed restrictions on their freedoms, thus limiting their ability to care for and act for themselves (3). However, the Court stated that this did not apply to Joshua because he was not under the State’s custody when he was harmed by his father (3). Even though Joshua was under the State’s custody for some time (i.e., when a hospital was granted temporary custody of him in 1983), the Court argued that the State did not become permanently responsible for guaranteeing his safety (3). While Rehnquist admitted that “the facts of this case are undeniably tragic,” he asserted that the physical damage inflicted upon Joshua was done by his father, not the State, and the State cannot control the actions of an individual (3). In addition, the Court contended that had the State removed Joshua from his father’s custody, the State itself would have faced charges of violating the due process clause by inappropriately infringing upon private matters (3). Rehnquist, furthermore, left it up to individual state law to determine liability in cases in which a state has failed to act. The due process clause would not be the basis for determining state accountability.

Justice William Brennan contended that the Court failed to see that “inaction can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a State undertakes a vital duty and then ignores it” (3). He argued that an individual who notifies the Department of Social Services of suspected child abuse is not obligated to do anything else after making the report, since the Department of Social Services exists to receive these reports and decide what action is required (3). Thus, the Department of Social Services, an entity of a state, assumes a duty to intervene when necessary because the cases would then fall under that state’s purview (3). Brennan even claimed that there is a restriction on the freedoms of abused children caused by limited access to nongovernmental sources of aid because a suspicion of child abuse is communicated only to the Department of Social Services and no other private entities (3). Because of this limitation on freedom imposed by a state, each state assumes a unique responsibility to these children and has a constitutional duty to protect them (5).

Brennan also criticized the Court’s view that the Fourteenth Amendment invokes only the notion of negative liberty (5). Negative liberty refers to an individual’s freedom from the power of the government; positive liberty, on the other hand, refers to the notion that government resources can be used to enforce an individual’s liberties (5). To Brennan, the idea of positive and negative liberties is, moreover, irrelevant to the present case because of the existence of the Department of Social Services, which is created by each state to protect children like Joshua (5). Justice Harry Blackmun also dissented and reiterated Brennan’s notion that “the facts here involve not mere passivity, but active state intervention in the life of Joshua DeShaney—intervention that triggered a fundamental duty to aid the boy once the State learned of the severe danger to which he was exposed” (3).

It is alarming that a state is not legally bound under the Constitution to act to safeguard a child when mandated reporters suspect child abuse and notify the appropriate agency. Certainly, the State was not the agent who physically beat Joshua into a coma, but the State did play an indirect role in Joshua’s fate. What, then, should determine state liability in child abuse cases—individual state laws or the Constitution? Either way, a state should be held accountable in cases like Joshua’s because of the current structure in which mandated reporters are obligated to inform state agencies of suspected child abuse. A state assumes a special relationship with child abuse victims, since it is the epicenter for dealing with mandated reporters, alleged child abuse victims, and suspected abusers. Physicians are legally compelled to report suspected child abuse cases to state entities and would be held accountable for failing to report; therefore, a state should be held accountable for what happens next (i.e., after the report is made), until a better schema in which a state is not the only entity privy to child abuse reports is established.